Intuitionistic logic with two Galois connections combined with Fischer
  Servi axioms by Dzik, Wojciech et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
8.
29
71
v1
  [
ma
th.
LO
]  
14
 A
ug
 20
12
INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC WITH TWO GALOIS CONNECTIONS
COMBINED WITH FISCHER SERVI AXIOMS
WOJCIECH DZIK, JOUNI JA¨RVINEN, AND MICHIRO KONDO
Abstract. Earlier, the authors introduced the logic IntGC, which is an exten-
sion of intuitionistic propositional logic by two rules of inference mimicking the
performance of Galois connections (Logic J. of the IGPL, 18:837-858, 2010).
In this paper, the extensions Int2GC and Int2GC+FS of IntGC are stud-
ied. Int2GC can be seen as a fusion of two IntGC logics, and Int2GC+FS
is obtained from Int2GC by adding instances of duality-like connections
3(A → B) → (2A → 3B) and (3A → 2B) → 2(A → B), introduced
by G. Fischer Servi (Rend. Sem. Mat. Univers. Politecn. Torino, 42:179-194,
1984), for interlinking the two Galois connections of Int2GC. Both Kripke-style
and algebraic semantics are presented for Int2GC and Int2GC+FS, and the
logics are proved to be complete with respect to both of these semantics. We
show that rough lattice-valued fuzzy sets defined on complete Heyting algebras
are proper algebraic models for Int2GC+FS. We also prove that Int2GC+FS
is equivalent to the intuitionistic tense logic IKt, and an axiomatisation of IKt
with the number of axioms reduced to the half of the number of axioms given
by W. B. Ewald (J. Symb. Log, 51:166–179, 1986) is presented.
Key words and phrases: intuitionistic logic, Galois connections, information logic, rough
lattice-valued fuzzy sets on complete Heyting algebras, Kripke semantics, intuitionistic
tense logic, completeness theorems.
1. Introduction and Motivation
In [15], Information Logic of Galois Connections (ILGC) was introduced as clas-
sical propositional logic with a pair of unary connectives N and ▽ mimicking a
Galois connection. Motivation for ILGC originates in rough set theory [16], where
it is assumed that our knowledge about objects of a universe of discourse U is
expressed by an information relation R. An information relation may reflect sim-
ilarity or difference between objects. For instance, R can be defined on the set of
all human beings in such a way that two persons are R-related if they are of the
same gender and the difference of their ages is less than a year. Originally, Pawlak
assumed information relations to be equivalences (reflexive, symmetric, and transi-
tive binary relations), so called indiscernibility relations, but in the literature can
be found numerous studies considering information relations of different type; see
[4], for example.
In terms of an information relation R, we may define the upper approximation
of a set X ⊆ U as
XN = {x ∈ U | (∃y ∈ U)xRy & y ∈ X},
and the lower approximation of X is
XH = {x ∈ U | (∀y ∈ U)xRy ⇒ y ∈ X}.
For instance, if R is the information relation considered above, then x ∈ XH if
all the persons that are coarsely of the same age and are of the same gender as x
belong to X , and x ∈ XN if there exists at least one such person. Therefore, H may
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be interpreted to represent certainty and N possibility with respect to knowledge
expressed by the relation R.
We may also define another pair of mappings ℘(U) → ℘(U) by reversing the
relation R. For any set X ⊆ U , let us define
X△ = {x ∈ U | (∃y ∈ U) yRx & y ∈ X}
and
X▽ = {x ∈ U | (∀y ∈ U) yRx⇒ y ∈ X}.
It is well-known that for any binary relation, the pairs (N,▽) and (△,H) are order-
preserving Galois connections ℘(U)→ ℘(U).
The logic ILGC was defined by adding to classical propositional logic two rules
of inference:
(GC▽N)
A→ ▽B
NA→ B
(GCN▽)
NA→ B
A→ ▽B
Another pair of connectives is introduced by De Morgan-type assertions:
(⋆) △A = ¬▽¬A and HA = ¬N¬A,
For △ and H the following rules are admissible in ILGC:
(GCH△)
A→ HB
△A→ B
(GC△H)
△A→ B
A→ HB
This means that in ILGC, we get another Galois connection (△,H) “for free”.
In [7], we introduced an intuitionistic propositional logic with a Galois con-
nection (IntGC) and studied its main properties. In addition to the intuitionistic
logic axioms and inference rule of Modus Ponens, IntGC contains rules (GC▽N)
and (GCN▽). Since the base logic is changed from classical to intuitionistic, the
classical-type assertions (⋆) can not be used to introduce another Galois connection.
More precisely, if we define the operators △, H from ▽, N in terms of intuitionistic
negation, the pair (△,H) does not form a Galois connection; see Lemma 3.3 in
[7]. Therefore, to define an intuitionistic logic of two Galois connections, the other
Galois connection must be declared by adding rules (GCH△) and (GC△H).
In Section 2, we define two intuitionistic logics with two Galois connections.
The first one, called Int2GC, is obtained by extending intuitionistic propositional
logic with the connectives N, H, △, ▽ and by rules (GC▽N), (GCN▽), (GCH△),
(GC△H). In Int2GC, the two Galois connections (N,▽) and (△,H) are not connected
with each other, and this means that Int2GC is simply the fusion of two IntGC
logics, the first one having the operators N and ▽, and the second has △ and
H. The logic Int2GC+FS is obtained by extending Int2GC with instances of the
axioms 3(A → B) → (2A → 3B) and (3A → 2B) → 2(A → B) introduced
by Fischer Servi [10]. This means that Int2GC+FS has duality-like connections
N(A→ B)→ (HA→ NB), △(A→ B)→ (▽A→ △B), (NA→ HB)→ H(A→ B),
and (△A→ ▽B)→ ▽(A→ B). These axioms defining Int2GC+FS are referred to as
(FS1), (FS2), (FS3), and (FS4), respectively. We show that in Int2GC, axioms (FS1)
and (FS4) are equivalent, and the same holds with (FS2) and (FS3). This implies
that we have several equivalent combinations of axioms to define Int2GC+FS.
Section 3 is devoted to H2GC- and H2GC+FS-algebras that are used for defin-
ing algebraic semantics for Int2GC and Int2GC+FS, respectively. H2GC-algebras
are Heyting algebras equipped with two order-preserving Galois connections (,)
and (,), and H2GC+FS-algebras are H2GC-algebras such that the operations
 and  are connected by an identity corresponding to axiom (FS1), and  and
 are connected by an equation that corresponds (FS2). In [6], J. M. Dunn stud-
ied distributive lattices with two operators 2 and 3. He introduced conditions
(D∧) 3x ∧ 2y ≤ 3(x ∧ y) and (D∨) 2(x ∨ y) ≤ 2x ∨ 3y for the interactions
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between 2 and 3. We show that H2GC+FS-algebras can be defined also as H2GC-
algebras satisfying the identities corresponding (D∧), that is, H2GC+FS-algebras
are H2GC-algebras satisfying a ∧ b → (a ∧ b) = 1 and a ∧ b → (a ∧ b) = 1.
In Section 3.2, we consider rough fuzzy sets defined on complete Heyting alge-
bras, and show how in this setting H2GC+FS-algebras arise naturally. Algebras of
rough fuzzy sets satisfy (D∧) when 3 and 2 are interpreted by
 and  (or  and
), but condition (D∨) is not satisfied. So, rough fuzzy sets are proper algebraic
models for Int2GC+FS. In Section 3.3, we introduce algebraic semantics for Int2GC
and Int2GC+FS with respect to H2GC- and H2GC+FS-algebras, respectively, and
present algebraic completeness theorems.
In Section 4, Kripke-semantics for Int2GC and Int2GC+FS are considered. We
begin with recalling Kripke-frames and completeness for IntGC from [7] in Sec-
tion 4.1. In addition, we introduce Kripke-frames and semantics for Int2GC and
Int2GC+FS, and soundness of both Int2GC and Int2GC+FS is proved. Canonical
frames of H2GC-algebras are introduced and Kripke-completeness is proved. Sec-
tion 4.1 ends by an example in which particular Kripke-frames for Int2GC+FS are
defined in terms of preference relations. In Section 4.2, we define canonical frames of
H2GC+FS-algebras, and Kripke-completeness of Int2GC+FS is proved by applying
canonical frames and algebraic completeness result of Int2GC+FS.
It is proved in [15] that ILGC is equivalent, with respect to provability, to the min-
imal (classical) tense logic Kt, that is, ILGC can be viewed as a simple formulation
of Kt. In Section 5, we prove that intuitionistic tense logic IKt, introduced by Ewald
[9], is equivalent syntactically to Int2GC+FS when N, H, △, ▽ are identified with
tense operators F , G, P , H , respectively. In other words, in IKt and Int2GC+FS
exactly the same formulas can be proved. This then means that Int2GC+FS can be
seen as an alternative formulation of IKt. In addition, we give an axiomatisation of
IKt with the number of axioms reduced to half of the number of axioms of IKt (with
the same rules) given by Ewald [9], and we present another definition of Int2GC
using only axioms of Ewald and rules admissible in IKt.
2. Intuitionistic logics with Galois connections and Fischer Servi
axioms
In this section we introduce two modal logics Int2GC and Int2GC+FS based on
intuitionistic propositional logic [3, 17]. We begin with recalling the intuitionistic
propositional logic with a Galois connection (IntGC) defined by the authors in [7].
The language of IntGC is constructed from an enumerable infinite set of proposi-
tional variables Var, the connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, →, and the unary operators N and
▽. The constant true is defined by setting ⊤ := p → p for some fixed proposi-
tional variable p ∈ Var, and the constant false is defined by ⊥ := ¬⊤. We also set
A ↔ B := (A → B) ∧ (B → A). The logic IntGC is the smallest logic that con-
tains intuitionistic propositional logic, and is closed under the rules of substitution,
modus ponens, and rules (GC▽N) and (GCN▽). The following rules are admissible
in IntGC:
(RN▽)
A
▽A
(RM▽)
A→ B
▽A→ ▽B
(RMN)
A→ B
NA→ NB
In addition, the following formulas are provable:
(GC1) A→ ▽NA and N▽A→ A;
(GC2) NA↔ N▽NA and ▽A↔ ▽N▽A;
(GC3) ▽⊤ and ¬N⊥;
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(GC4) ▽(A ∧B)↔ ▽A ∧▽B and N(A ∨B)↔ NA ∨ NB;
(GC5) ▽(A→ B)→ (▽A→ ▽B).
The language of the logic Int2GC is the one of IntGC extended by two unary
connectives △ and H, and the logic Int2GC is the smallest logic extending IntGC by
rules (GCH△) and (GC△H). Obviously, in Int2GC also the rules:
(RNH)
A
HA
(RMH)
A→ B
HA→ ▽B
(RM△)
A→ B
△A→ △B
are admissible, and the following formulas are provable:
(GC1)⋆ A→ H△A and △HA→ A;
(GC2)⋆ △A↔ △H△A and HA↔ H△HA;
(GC3)⋆ H⊤ and ¬△⊥;
(GC4)⋆ H(A ∧B)↔ HA ∧ HB and △(A ∨B)↔ △A ∨ △B;
(GC5)⋆ H(A→ B)→ (HA→ HB).
Intuitionistic modal logic IK was introduced by G. Fischer Servi in [10]. The
logic IK is obtained by adding two modal connectives 3 and 2 to intuitionistic
logic satisfying the following axioms:
(IK1) 3(A ∨B)→ 3A ∨3B
(IK2) 2A ∧ 2B → 2(A ∧B)
(IK3) ¬3⊥
(IK4) 3(A→ B)→ (2A→ 3B)
(IK5) (3A→ 2B)→ 2(A→ B)
In addition, the monotonicity rules for both 3 and 2 are admissible, that is:
(RM3)
A→ B
3A→ 3B
(RM2)
A→ B
2A→ 2B
In this work, we call axioms (IK4) and (IK5) the Fischer Servi axioms, and they
have a special role in interlinking the two Galois connections of Int2GC. From (IK4)
and (IK5) we can form the following four axioms by replacing 2 and 3 by H and
N, and by ▽ and △, respectively:
(FS1) N(A→ B)→ (HA→ NB)
(FS2) △(A→ B)→ (▽A→ △B)
(FS3) (NA→ HB)→ H(A→ B)
(FS4) (△A→ ▽B)→ ▽(A→ B)
Proposition 2.1. In Int2GC, the following assertions hold:
(a) Axioms (FS1) and (FS4) are equivalent.
(b) Axioms (FS2) and (FS3) are equivalent.
Proof. We prove only assertion (a), because (b) can be proved analogously. Here
⊢ A denotes that A is provable in Int2GC.
(FS1)⇒(FS4): Let us set X := A, Y := H△A and Z := N▽B in the provable
formula (X → Y ) → ((Y → Z) → (X → Z)). We get ⊢ (H△A → N▽B) →
(A → N▽B) by using also ⊢ A → H△A. This is equivalent to ⊢ A ∧ (H△A →
N▽B)→ N▽B. Because ⊢ N▽B → B, this means ⊢ A ∧ (H△A→ N▽B)→ B and
⊢ (H△A → N▽B) → (A → B). If we set A := △A and B := ▽B in (FS1), we
obtain ⊢ N(△A → ▽B) → (H△A → N▽B), and so ⊢ N(△A → ▽B) → (A → B).
This implies ⊢ (△A→ ▽B)→ ▽(A→ B) by (GCN▽).
(FS4)⇒(FS1): We set X := △HA, Y := A and Z := B in (X → Y )→ ((Y → Z)→
(X → Z)). This gives ⊢ (△HA → A) → ((A → B) → (△HA → B)), and ⊢ (A →
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B) → (△HA → ▽NB), since ⊢ △HA → A and ⊢ B → ▽NB. By monotonicity,
⊢ N(A→ B)→ N(△HA→ ▽NB). By setting A := HA and B := NB in (FS4), we
have ⊢ (△HA → ▽NB) → ▽(HA → NB) and ⊢ N(△HA → ▽NB) → (HA → NB)
by (GC▽N). Therefore, we obtain ⊢ N(A→ B)→ (HA→ NB). 
The logic Int2GC+FS is defined as the extension of Int2GC that satisfies also
the Fischer Servi axioms (FS1)–(FS4). By Proposition 2.1 it is clear that we have
several equivalent axiomatisations of Int2GC+FS, that is:
Int2GC+FS = Int2GC+ {(FS1) or (FS4)}+ {(FS2) or (FS3)}.
The logic Int2GC+FS satisfies the counterparts of axioms (IK1)–(IK5) of IK, so
Int2GC+FS can be regarded as a intuitionistic bi-modal logic, and the pairs N, H
and △, ▽ are intuitionistic modal connectives in the sense of Fischer Servi.
3. Algebraic Semantics and Completeness
3.1. H2GC-algebras and H2GC+FS-algebras. In [7], we introduced HGC-
algebras as counterparts of the logic IntGC, and we showed that IntGC is complete
with respect to HGC-algebras. In this section, we define H2GC- and H2GC+FS-
algebras and give completeness theorems for Int2GC and Int2GC+FS in terms of
these algebras.
Let ϕ : P → Q and ψ : Q→ P be maps between ordered sets P and Q. The pair
(ϕ, ψ) is a Galois connection between P and Q, if for all p ∈ P and q ∈ Q,
ϕ(p) ≤ q ⇐⇒ p ≤ ψ(q).
For a Galois connection (ϕ, ψ), ϕ preserves all existing joins and ψ preserves all
existing meets. If P and Q are bounded, then ϕ(0) = 0 and ψ(1) = 1. In addition,
a pair (ϕ, ψ) forms a Galois connection if and only if the following conditions hold:
(i) p ≤ ψ(ϕ(p)) for all p ∈ P and ϕ(ψ(q)) ≤ q for all q ∈ Q;
(ii) the maps ϕ and ψ are order-preserving.
In particular, if ϕ and ψ are maps on a lattice L, then the pair (ϕ, ψ) is a Galois
connection on L if and only if the following identities are satisfied for all a, b ∈ L:
(gc1) ϕ(a ∨ b) = ϕ(a) ∨ ϕ(b) and ψ(a ∧ b) = ψ(a) ∧ ψ(b)
(gc2) a = a ∧ ψ(ϕ(a)) and a = a ∨ ϕ(ψ(a))
More properties of Galois connections can be found in [8], for instance.
A Heyting algebra H is a lattice with 0 such that for all a, b ∈ H , there is a
greatest element x of H with a ∧ x ≤ b. This element is the relative pseudocom-
plement of a with respect to b, and is denoted a → b. Note that Heyting algebras
are always distributive pseudocomplemented lattices such that the pseudocomple-
ment ¬a of a is a → 0. Because ¬0 is the greatest element, Heyting algebras are
bounded. Thus, a Heyting algebra H can be considered as an algebraic structure
H = (H,∨,∧,→, 0), which can be equationally defined as follows (see e.g. [1]):
(h1) A set of identities which define lattice with 0
(h2) x ∧ (x→ y) = x ∧ y
(h3) x ∧ (y → z) = x ∧ ((x ∧ y)→ (x ∧ z))
(h4) z ∧ (x ∧ y → x) = x
Note also that if H is a Heyting algebra, then (gc2) can be written in the form
(gc2)∗ a→ ψ(ϕ(a)) = 1 and ϕ(ψ(a))→ a = 1.
An HGC-algebra is an algebra (H,∨,∧,→, 0,,), where H = (H,∨,∧,→, 0) is
a Heyting algebra and (,) is a Galois connection on H. By the above, HGC-
algebras form an equational class. HGC-algebras are usually denoted by (H,,).
An H2GC-algebra (H,∨,∧,→, 0,,,,) is such that H = (H,∨,∧,→, 0) is a
Heyting algebra, and (H,,) and (H,,) are H2GC-algebras, meaning that
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(,) and (,) are Galois connections on H. Also H2GC-algebras form an equa-
tional class. We denote H2GC-algebras simply by (H,,,,).
For an H2GC-algebra (H,,,,), we introduce the following identities corre-
sponding to the instances (FS1)–(FS4) of the Fischer Servi axioms:
(fs1) (a→ b) → (a → b) = 1
(fs2) (a→ b) → (a → b) = 1
(fs3) (a → b)→ (a→ b) = 1
(fs4) (a → b)→ (a→ b) = 1
In [6], J. M. Dunn studied minimal positive modal logic K+ with the connectives
∧, ∨, 2, and 3. K+ can be described in algebraic terms as modal logic based on
a distributive lattice with two operations 2 and 3, where 2 distributes over ∧, 3
distributes over ∨, and the following two conditions hold:
(D∧) 3a ∧ 2b ≤ 3(a ∧ b)
(D∨) 2(a ∨ b) ≤ 2a ∨3b
We introduce the instances of (D∧) as identities defined on an H2GC-algebra:
(d1) a ∧ b → (a ∧ b) = 1
(d2) a ∧ b → (a ∧ b) = 1
Now we may write the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Let (H,,,,) be an H2GC-algebra.
(a) Identities (fs1), (d1), and (fs4) are equivalent.
(b) Identities (fs2), (d2), and (fs3) are equivalent.
Proof. (a) Let us set a := a→ b and b := a in (d1). We obtain (a→ b)∧a ≤ (a∧
(a→ b)) ≤ b, because a∧ (a → b) ≤ b. This gives directly (a→ b) ≤ a → b,
that is, (a → b) → (a → b) = 1, and so (d1) implies (fs1). Conversely, if we
set b := a ∧ b in (fs1), we have b ≤ (a → b) ≤ (a → a ∧ b) ≤ a → (a ∧ b),
because a→ a∧ b = a→ b and b ≤ a→ b. This is equivalent to a∧ b ≤ (a∧ b),
and (a ∧ b)→ (a∧ b) = 1. Thus, also (fs1) implies (d1), and (fs1) and (d1) are
equivalent.
Suppose that (fs1) holds. Then (a → b) ≤ a → b. Since a ≤ a and
b ≤ b, we have (a → b) ≤ a→ b. This is equivalent to a → b ≤ (a→ b)
and (a → b) → (a → b) = 1, that is, (fs4) is true. On the other hand, if (fs4)
holds, then a → b ≤ a → b ≤ (a → b), that is, (a → b) ≤ a → b,
(a→ b) ≤ (a → b) = 1, and (fs1) is true. Hence, (fs1) and (fs4) are equivalent.
Case (b) can be proved analogously. 
An H2GC+FS-algebra is an H2GC-algebra (H,,,,) satisfying (fs1) and
(fs2). By Proposition 3.1, H2GC+FS-algebras have several equivalent characteri-
sations. Clearly, H2GC+FS-algebras form an equational class.
3.2. Rough fuzzy sets on complete Heyting algebras. We consider here rough
lattice-valued fuzzy sets defined on complete Heyting algebras. These are also
closely connected to fuzzy Galois connections studied, for instance, in [2, 11].
A complete Heyting algebra is a Heyting algebra such that its underlying ordered
set is a complete lattice. A complete lattice L satisfies the join-infinite distributive
law if for any S ⊆ L and x ∈ L,
(JID) x ∧
(∨
S
)
=
∨
{x ∧ y | y ∈ S}.
A complete lattice is a Heyting algebra if and only if it satisfies (JID) (see e.g.
[13,17]). Thus, complete Heyting algebras are the complete lattices satisfying (JID).
Fuzzy sets were generalized to L-fuzzy sets by J. A. Goguen in such a way that
an L-fuzzy set ϕ on U is a mapping ϕ : U → L, where U is any set representing
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objects of some universe of discourse and L is a partially ordered set [12]. The set
LU of all maps from U to L is then the set of all L-fuzzy sets on U . The set LU
can be equipped whatever operators L has, and these induced operators obey any
law valid in L which extends pointwise.
Here we assume that H is a complete Heyting algebra, therefore we can make
HU a complete Heyting algebra by defining
(∨
i∈I
ϕi
)
(a) =
∨
i∈I
ϕi(a) and
(∧
i∈I
ϕi
)
(a) =
∧
i∈H
ϕi(a)
for all {ϕi}i∈I ⊆ HU . The least element of HU is 0 : x 7→ 0 and the greatest
element of HU is 1 : x 7→ 1. Furthermore, HU is relatively pseudocomplemented in
such a way that for all ϕ, ψ ∈ LU and a ∈ U ,
(ϕ→ ψ)(a) = ϕ(a)→ ψ(a)
We denote this complete Heyting algebra by HU . Elements of this Heyting algebra
are called H-sets.
Dubois and Prade introduced rough fuzzy sets in [5]. The idea is that the objects
to be approximated are fuzzy sets, and the approximations are determined by means
of fuzzy relations. Here we study rough H-sets, which means that approximations
of H-sets are determined by H-fuzzy relations.
Let ϕ be an H-set and let R be an H-fuzzy relation on U , that is, R is a mapping
from U × U to H . Then, we may define the H-sets ϕN and ϕH by setting
ϕN(x) =
∨
y∈U
{R(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y)}
ϕH(x) =
∧
y∈U
{R(x, y)→ ϕ(y)}
for all x ∈ U . The H-sets ϕN and ϕH are called the upper and the lower approxi-
mations of ϕ.
We can define another pair of mappings in terms of the inverse of R by setting
ϕ△(x) =
∨
y∈U
{R(y, x) ∧ ϕ(y)}
ϕ▽(x) =
∧
y∈U
{R(y, x)→ ϕ(y)}
for all x ∈ U . It is clear that if ϕ is a two-valued set on U and R is a two-valued
binary relation on U , then the operations N, H, △, and ▽ coincide with the rough
set operators defined by a binary relation.
Proposition 3.2. For any complete Heyting algebra H and an H-fuzzy relation R
on U , the algebra of rough H-sets (HU , N, H, △, ▽) is an H2GC+FS-algebra.
Proof. Suppose ϕ and ψ are H-sets such that ϕ ≤ ψ. Then for all y ∈ U , R(x, y)∧
ϕ(y) ≤ R(x, y) ∧ ψ(y) and this implies
ϕN(x) =
∨
y∈U
{R(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y)} ≤
∨
y∈U
{R(x, y) ∧ ψ(y)} = ψN(x).
Similarly, R(y, x)→ ϕ(y) ≤ R(y, x)→ ψ(y) for all y ∈ U . Thus,
ϕ▽(x) =
∧
y∈U
{R(y, x)→ ϕ(y)} ≤
∧
y∈U
{R(y, x)→ ψ(y)} = ψ▽(x).
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So, N and ▽ are order-preserving. By definition, for all x ∈ U ,
ϕ▽N(x) =
∨
y∈U
{R(x, y) ∧ ϕ▽(y)} =
∨
y∈U
{
R(x, y) ∧
∧
z∈U
{R(z, y)→ ϕ(z)}
}
≤
∨
y∈U
{R(x, y) ∧ (R(x, y)→ ϕ(x) ) } ≤
∨
y∈U
{ϕ(x)} = ϕ(x).
This means that ϕN▽ ≤ ϕ. Analogously, for any x ∈ U ,
ϕN▽(x) =
∧
y∈U
{R(y, x)→ ϕN(y)} =
∧
y∈U
{
R(y, x)→
∨
z∈U
{R(y, z) ∧ ϕ(z)}
}
≥
∧
y∈U
{R(y, x)→ (R(y, x) ∧ ϕ(x) )} ≥
∧
y∈U
{ϕ(x)} = ϕ(x).
Thus, also ϕ ≤ ϕN▽. We have that (N, ▽) is a Galois connection, because (gc1) and
(gc2) are satisfied. Similarly, we can show that (△, H) is a Galois connection.
Next we show that (d1) holds. For all x, y ∈ U , we have
R(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(x)H = R(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y) ∧
∧
z∈U
{R(x, z)→ ψ(z)}
≤ R(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y) ∧ (R(x, y)→ ψ(y))
= (R(x, y) ∧ (R(x, y)→ ψ(y))) ∧ ϕ(y)
= R(x, y) ∧ ψ(y) ∧ ϕ(y)
= R(x, y) ∧ (ϕ ∧ ψ)(y)
≤
∨
z∈U
{R(x, z) ∧ (ϕ ∧ ψ)(z)}
= (ϕ ∧ ψ)N(x).
Hence, for all y ∈ U ,
R(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y) ∧ ψ(x)H ≤ (ϕ ∧ ψ)N(x).
Because complete Heyting algebras satisfy the join-infinite distributive law, we have
that for all x ∈ U ,
(ϕN ∧ ψH)(x) = ϕN(x) ∧ ψH(x) =
∨
y∈U
{R(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y)} ∧ ψH(x)
=
∨
y∈U
{R(x, y) ∧ ϕ(y) ∧ ψH(x)} ≤ (ϕ ∧ ψ)N(x).
Thus, ϕN ∧ ψH ≤ (ϕ ∧ ψ)N. Assertion (d2) can be proved similarly. 
Example 3.3. The instances
(a ∨ b) ≤ a ∨ b and (a ∨ b) ≤ a ∨ b
of Dunn’s axiom (D∨) are false in some H2GC+FS-algebras of rough H-sets.
Namely, let U = {x, y} and consider the finite (and hence complete) Heyting
algebra 22 ⊕ 1, that is, H = {0, a, b, c, 1} the Heyting algebra with the order 0 <
a, b < c < 1, where a and b are incomparable. Note that ¬a = b and ¬b = a.
We define two H-sets ϕ, ψ on U by setting ϕ(u) = 0 and ψ(u) = 1 for all u ∈ U .
An H-fuzzy relation R : U × U → H is defined by R(x, x) = R(y, y) = a and
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R(x, y) = R(y, x) = b. Then,
(ϕ ∨ ψ)H(x) =
∧
u∈U
(R(x, u)→ (ϕ ∨ ψ)(u) =
∧
u∈U
(R(x, u)→ (ϕ(u) ∨ ψ(u))
=
∧
u∈U
(R(x, u)→ 1) = (a→ 1) ∧ (b→ 1) = 1 ∧ 1 = 1,
but
ϕH(x) ∨ ψN(x) =
∧
u∈U
(R(x, u)→ ϕ(u)) ∨
∨
u∈U
(R(x, u) ∧ ψ(u))
=
∧
u∈U
(R(x, u)→ 0) ∨
∨
u∈U
(R(x, u) ∧ 1)
=
∧
u∈U
¬R(x, u) ∨
∨
u∈U
R(x, u)
= (¬R(x, x) ∧ ¬R(x, y)) ∨ (R(x, x) ∨R(x, y))
= (¬a ∧ ¬b) ∨ (a ∨ b) = 0 ∨ c = c.
Hence condition (ϕ ∨ ψ) ≤ ϕ ∨ ψ is not satisfied, because 1  c. Similarly, we
can show that
(ϕ ∨ ψ)▽(y) = 1 and ϕ▽(y) ∨ ψ△(y) = 0 ∨ c = c ,
that is, (ϕ ∨ ψ) ≤ ϕ ∨ ψ is not satisfied.
Hence, we may conclude this subsection by stating that the rough lattice-
valued fuzzy sets defined on complete Heyting algebras are algebraic models for
Int2GC+FS.
3.3. Algebraic Semantics and Completeness. As we already noted, IntGC is
complete with respect to HGC-algebras. Here we show completeness of Int2GC and
IntGC+FS with respect to H2GC- and H2GC+FS-algebras.
Let (H,,,,) be an H2GC-algebra, where H = (H,∨,∧,→, 0). A valuation
is a function v : Var → H assigning to each propositional variable p an element
v(p) of H . Let Φ denote the set of well-formed Int2GC-formulas. Clearly, Φ is the
set of well-formed Int2GC+FS-formulas as well, because these logics have the same
language. The valuation v can be extended to the set Φ inductively1:
v(¬A) = v(A)→ 0 v(A→ B) = v(A)→ v(B)
v(A ∧B) = v(A) ∧ v(B) v(A ∨B) = v(A) ∨ v(B)
v(NA) = v(A) v(HA) = v(A)
v(△A) = v(A) v(▽A) = v(A)
An Int2GC-formula A is valid if v(A) = 1 for any valuation v on any H2GC-algebra.
Similarly, we may define validity of Int2GC+FS-formulas over H2GC+FS-algebras.
Theorem 3.4 (Soundness I).
(a) Provable Int2GC-formulas are valid in H2GC-algebras
(b) Provable Int2GC+FS-formulas are valid in H2GC+FS-algebras.
Proof. The proof concerning intuitionistic logic is standard (see [17], for instance).
As we have proved in [7] for IntGC, rules (GC▽N), (GCN▽), (GCH△), (GC△H)
preserve validity. Thus, (a) holds. For (b), it is clear that axioms (FS1) and (FS2)
are valid, because H2GC+FS-algebras satisfy identities (fs1) and (fs2). 
1Note that the idea is that the operations , , ,  may be obtained from their logical
counterparts N, H, △, ▽ just by turning them 90 degrees clockwise.
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To obtain completeness, we apply Lindenbaum–Tarski algebras. We denote by
Φ the algebra of Φ-formulas, that is, the abstract algebra
Φ = (Φ,∨,∧,→,⊥,N,H,△,▽).
We define two equivalences ≡1 and ≡2 on Φ:
A ≡1 B if and only if A↔ B is provable in Int2GC;
A ≡2 B if and only if A↔ B is provable in Int2GC+FS.
Concerning ∨, ∧, and→, the next result is known from the theory of intuitionistic
logic, and for N, H, △, and ▽ the claim follows from monotonicity.
Lemma 3.5. The equivalences ≡1 and ≡2 are congruences on Φ.
For any A ∈ Φ, we denote by [A]1 and [A]2 the congruence class of A with
respect to the congruences ≡1 and ≡2. The sets of ≡1- and ≡2-classes are denoted
by Φ/≡1 and Φ/≡2. Next we define the quotient algebras of Φ with respect to ≡1
and ≡2 by introducing the following operations on Φ/≡i for i = 1, 2:
[A]i ∨i [B]i = [A ∨B]i [A]i ∧i [B]i = [A ∧B]i
[A]i →i [B]i = [A→ B]i 0i = [⊥]i
[A]i
i = [NA]i [A]i
i = [HA]i
[A]i
i = [△A]i [A]i
i = [▽A]i
As we have noted, H2GC- and H2GC+FS-algebras form equational classes. By
the theory of intuitionistic logic, Φ/≡1 satisfies the identities defining Heyting al-
gebras. Also (gc1) and (gc2) hold by (GC1), (GC1)∗, (GC4), (GC4)∗. Since also
identities (fs1) and (fs2) are the counterparts of axioms (FS1) and (FS2), we may
write the following proposition.
Proposition 3.6.
(a) The algebra (Φ/≡1,∨1,∧1,→1,01,
1 ,1 ,1 ,1) is an H2GC-algebra.
(b) The algebra (Φ/≡2,∨2,∧2,→2,02,2 ,2 ,2 ,2) is an H2GC+FS-algebra.
We define two valuations v1 : Var → Φ/≡1 and v2 : Var → Φ/≡2 by:
v1(p) = [p]1 and v2(p) = [p]2.
By a straightforward formula induction we see that v1(A) = [A]1 and v2(A) = [A]2
for all formulas A ∈ Φ. We can now write the following results.
Lemma 3.7. For any formula A ∈ Φ:
(a) A is provable in Int2GC if and only if v1(A) = 1.
(b) A is provable in Int2GC+FS if and only if v2(A) = 1.
Theorem 3.8 (Completeness I). For any formula A ∈ Φ:
(a) A is provable in Int2GC if and only if A valid in H2GC-algebras.
(b) A is provable in Int2GC+FS if and only if A valid in H2GC+FS-algebras.
Proof. (a) Suppose that A is valid in H2GC-algebras. We have v1(A) = 1 in Φ/≡1,
that is, A is provable. The other direction is proved in Theorem 3.4. For (b), the
proof is basically the same. 
Clearly, rough H-sets considered in Section 3.2 provide algebraic models for
Int2GC+FS. Let us introduce axioms (D1) and (D2) corresponding to equations
(d1) and (d2):
(D1) NA ∧HB → N(A ∧B)
(D2) △A ∧▽B → △(A ∧B)
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By Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 3.8, we can write the following corollary giving
additional ways to axiomatize Int2GC+FS.
Corollary 3.9.
Int2GC+FS = Int2GC+ {(FS1) or (FS4) or (D1)}+ {(FS2) or (FS3) or (D2)}
By Example 3.3 and Theorem 3.8, formulas H(A∨B)→ HA∨NB and ▽(A∨B)→
▽A ∨△B corresponding to Dunn’s condition (D∨) are not provable in Int2GC+FS.
4. Kripke semantics and completeness
4.1. Kripke frames. In this section we consider Kripke frames and models for the
three systems IntGC, Int2GC, and Int2GC+FS, where the system Int2GC+FS will be
shown in Section 5 to be equivalent to intuitionistic temporal logic IKt.
IntGC-frames. A structure F = (X,≤, R) is called a Kripke frame of IntGC (an
IntGC-frame, in short) [7], if X is a non-empty set, ≤ is a preorder (reflexive and
transitive binary relation) on X , and R is a relation on X such that
(R1) (≥ ◦R ◦ ≥) ⊆ R.
Let v be a function v : P → ℘(X) assigning to each propositional variable p a
subset v(p) of X with the property that x ∈ v(p) and x ≤ y imply y ∈ v(p), that
is, v(p) is ≤-closed. Such functions are called valuations and the pair M = (F , v)
is called an IntGC-model. For any x ∈ X and A ∈ Φ, we define the satisfiability
relation in M inductively by the following way:
x |= p ⇐⇒ x ∈ v(p),
x |= A ∧B ⇐⇒ x |= A and x |= A,
x |= A ∨B ⇐⇒ x |= A or x |= A,
x |= A→ B ⇐⇒ for all y ≥ x, y |= A implies y |= B,
x |= ¬A ⇐⇒ for no y ≥ x does y |= A,
x |= NA ⇐⇒ exists y such that xR y and y |= A, and
x |= ▽A ⇐⇒ for all y, y R x implies y |= A.
Note that the satisfiability relation |= is persistent, that is, for all formulas A, if
x |= A and x ≤ y, then y |= A. An IntGC-formula A is valid in a model M, if
x |= A for all x ∈ X . The formula A is valid in a frame F , if A is valid in every
model based on F . A formula is Kripke-valid if it is valid in every frame.
We noted in [7] that IntGC is Kripke-sound, that is, every provable IntGC-formula
is Kripke-valid. We also proved Kripke-completeness by applying canonical frames,
and next we shortly recall these constructions, because a similar technique will be
used later in cases of Int2GC and Int2GC+FS.
For an HGC-algebra (H,,), its canonical frame is a triple (XH ,⊆, RH) such
that XH is the set of the prime filters of the lattice H and the relation R
H is defined
by
(x, y) ∈ RH ⇐⇒ y ⊆ [x]
−1
,
where [x]
−1
= {a ∈ H | a ∈ x}. The relation RH can be described also in terms
of the map  by
(x, y) ∈ RH ⇐⇒ [y]
−1
⊆ x,
where [y]
−1
= {a ∈ H | a ∈ y}.
For a Heyting algebra H, we denote by O(H) the set of all ≤-closed subsets.
Lemma 4.1. Let (H,,) be an HGC-algebra. The pair
(

−1
,
−1)
is a Galois
connection on (O(H),⊆).
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Proof. Let x, y ∈ O(H). Suppose [x]
−1
⊆ y. If a ∈ x, then a ≤ a implies
a ∈ x, because x ∈ O(H). This means that a ∈ [x]
−1
⊆ y and so a ∈ [y]
−1
.
Therefore, x ⊆ [y]
−1
. Conversely, assume that x ⊆ [y]
−1
. If a ∈ [x]
−1
, then
a ∈ x ⊆ [y]
−1
, that is, a ∈ y. Because a ≤ a, we have a ∈ y, since
y ∈ O(H). Thus, [x]
−1
⊆ y. 
Let (H,,) be an HGC-algebra. In [7], we showed that the canonical frame
FH = (XH ,⊆, RH) is an IntGC-frame. Let v : Var → H be a valuation on this
HGC-algebra. We may now define a valuation v∗ : Var → XH for the canonical
frame FH by setting x ∈ v∗(p) if and only if v(p) ∈ x for all p ∈ Var. Obviously,
for all x, y ∈ XH and p ∈ Var, x ∈ v
∗(p) and x ⊆ y imply y ∈ v∗(p), so v∗ is really
a valuation. In the canonical model (FH , v∗), we have x |= p if and only if v(p) ∈ x
for all x ∈ XH . In [7], we proved by formula induction the Key Lemma stating
that for any IntGC-formula A and x ∈ XH , x |= A if and only if v(A) ∈ x. This
enabled us to prove the Kripke-completeness, that is, an IntGC-formula is provable
if and only if it is Kripke-valid.
Int2GC-frames. An Int2GC-frame (or a Kripke frame of Int2GC) is a quadruple
F = (X,≤, R1, R2) such that X is a non-empty set, ≤ is a preorder on X , and R1
and R2 are relations on X satisfying
(R2) (≥ ◦R1 ◦ ≥) ⊆ R1
(R3) (≤ ◦R2 ◦ ≤) ⊆ R2.
Our next lemma is obvious.
Lemma 4.2. (X,≤, R1, R2) is an Int2GC-frame if and only if (X,≤, R1) and
(X,≤, R2
−1) are IntGC-frames.
In Int2GC-frames the valuations and the satisfiability relation |= for ∨, ∧, →,
and ¬ are defined as earlier, but satisfiability of formulas NA, ▽A, △A, and HA are
defined by
x |= NA ⇐⇒ exists y such that xR1 y and y |= A,
x |= ▽A ⇐⇒ for all y, y R1 x implies y |= A,
x |= △A ⇐⇒ exists y such that y R2 x and y |= A, and
x |= HA ⇐⇒ for all y, xR2 y implies y |= A.
It is obvious that Int2GC is Kripke-sound, that is, every formula provable in Int2GC
is Kripke valid.
We can introduce two IntGC-logics, one with the operators N and ▽, and the
other with △ and H. We denote these by IntGC1 and IntGC2, respectively. Next we
show that Int2GC extends IntGC1 and IntGC2.
Lemma 4.3. Let Fi = (X,≤, Ri) be a Kripke-frame for IntGCi and let Ai be a
well-formed formula of IntGCi, where i = 1, 2. Then, Ai is valid in Fi if and only
if Ai is valid in F = (X,≤, R1, R
−1
2 ).
Proof. We prove the claim by formula induction. Concerning IntGC1-frames and
-formulas, the claim is obvious.
Let v be a valuation for the frame F2 = (X,≤, R2). Thus, M2 = (F2, v) is an
IntGC2-model and M = (F , v) is an Int2GC-model.
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Let A2 be a formula of IntGC2 which is of the form △A for some IntGC2-formula
A having this property. Then, for all x ∈ X ,
M2, x |= △A ⇐⇒ (∃y)xR2 y and M2, y |= A
⇐⇒ (∃y)xR2 y and M, y |= A
⇐⇒ (∃y) y R2
−1 x and M, y |= A
⇐⇒ M, x |= △A
Therefore, A2 is valid in F2 if and only if A2 is valid in F . The claim concerning
the operator H can be proved analogously. 
The canonical Int2GC-frame of an H2GC-algebra (H,,,,) is a structure
(XH ,⊆, RH1 , R
H
2 ), where XH is the set of lattice-filters of H and the relations R
H
1
and RH2 are defined by
(x, y) ∈ RH1 ⇐⇒ y ⊆ [x]

−1
and (x, y) ∈ RH2 ⇐⇒ [x]

−1
⊆ y
where [x]
−1
= {a ∈ H | a ∈ x}. Equivalently, these relations can be defined as
(x, y) ∈ RH1 ⇐⇒ [y]

−1
⊆ x and (x, y) ∈ RH2 ⇐⇒ x ⊆ [y]

−1
in which [y]
−1
= {a ∈ H | a ∈ y}. The next lemma is obvious and its proof is
omitted.
Lemma 4.4.
(

−1
,
−1)
and
(

−1
,
−1)
are Galois connections on (O(H),⊆).
Similarly, as in the case of HGC-algebras, we can show that the canonical frame
FH = (XH ,⊆, RH1 , R
H
2 ) of any H2GC-algebra (H,
,,,) is an Int2GC-frame.
For any valuation v on H , we can define the valuation v∗ for the canonical frame
FH by setting x ∈ v∗(p) if and only if v(p) ∈ x for all propositional variables
p ∈ Var and x ∈ XH . As in case of IntGC (see Lemma 5.7 in [7]), we can prove
by formula induction that the Key Lemma holds, that is, for any Int2GC-formula
A and x ∈ XH , x |= A if and only if v(A) ∈ x. Therefore, we may state the
Kripke-completeness presented in the next theorem.
Theorem 4.5 (Completeness II for Int2GC). A formula A is provable in
Int2GC if and only if A is Kripke-valid.
Proof. Suppose that an Int2GC-formula A is not provable. This means that there
exists an H2GC-algebra (H,,,,) and a valuation v : Var → H such that
v(A) 6= 1. We construct the canonical frame FH and the valuation v∗ as above.
Because v(A) 6= 1, there exists a prime filter x such that v(A) /∈ x. By the Key
Lemma, this means that x 6|= A in the canonical model (FH , v∗). Therefore, A is
not Kripke-valid. 
Int2GC+FS-frames. An Int2GC+FS-frame (of a Kripke frame of Int2GC+FS)
is a tripe F = (X,≤, R), where X is a non-empty set, ≤ is a preorder on X , and
R is a relation on X satisfying
(R4) (R ◦ ≤) ⊆ (≤ ◦R)
(R5) (≥ ◦R) ⊆ (R ◦ ≥).
Lemma 4.6. (X,≤, R) is an Int2GC+FS-frame if and only if (X,≤, R ◦ ≥,≤ ◦R)
is an Int2GC-frame.
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Proof. Suppose (X,≤, R) is an Int2GC+FS-frame. Let R1 = R◦≥ and R2 = ≤◦R.
We show that the relations R1 and R2 satisfy conditions (R2) and (R3). Now
≥◦R1 ◦≥ = ≥◦ (R ◦≥) ◦≥ = ≥◦R ◦≥ = (≥◦R) ◦≥ ⊆ (R ◦≥) ◦≥ = R ◦≥ = R1,
that is, (R2) is satisfied. Similarly, ≤ ◦ R2 ◦ ≤ = ≤ ◦ (≤ ◦ R) ◦ ≤ = ≤ ◦ R ◦ ≤ =
≤◦(R◦≤) ⊆ ≤◦(≤◦R) = ≤◦R = R2, and also (R3) holds. Thus, (X,≤, R◦≥,≤◦R)
is an Int2GC-frame.
Conversely, suppose that (X,≤, R ◦ ≥,≤ ◦R) is an Int2GC-frame. We again put
R1 = R◦≥ and R2 = ≤◦R. Then, R◦≤ ⊆ ≤◦R◦≤ = R2◦≤ ⊆ ≤◦R2◦≤ ⊆ R2 = ≤◦
R, that is, (R4) holds. Similarly, ≥◦R ⊆ ≥◦R◦≥ = ≥◦R1 ⊆ ≥◦R1≥ ⊆ R1 = R◦≥.
Hence, also (R5) is satisfied and (X,≤, R) is an Int2GC+FS-frame. 
Corollary 4.7. (X,≤, R) is an Int2GC+FS-frame if and only if (X,≤, R ◦ ≥) and
(X,≤, R−1 ◦ ≥) are IntGC-frames
Proof. The claim follows directly from Lemmas 4.2 and 4.6, because (≤ ◦ R)−1 =
R−1 ◦ ≥. 
Again, in Int2GC+FS-frames the valuations and the satisfiability relation |= for
∨, ∧, →, and ¬ are defined as earlier, and satisfiability of NA, ▽A, △A, and HA
are defined by
x |= NA ⇐⇒ exists y such that x (R ◦ ≥) y and y |= A
x |= ▽A ⇐⇒ for all y, y (R ◦ ≥)x implies y |= A
x |= △A ⇐⇒ exists y such that y (≤ ◦R)x and y |= A
x |= HA ⇐⇒ for all y, x (≤ ◦R) y implies y |= A
Lemma 4.8. For all Int2GC+FS-models M = (F , v) and formulas A ∈ Φ:
x |= A and x ≤ y imply y |= A.
Proof. As an example, we show the claim for △ and H.
(△A) Suppose x |= △A and x ≤ y. Then, there exists z such that z(≤ ◦ R)x
and z |= A. Thus, there is w such that z ≤ w, wRx, and z |= A. Now wRx and
x ≤ y imply w(R ◦≤)y. From frame condition (R4), we get w(≤◦R)y. Now z ≤ w
implies z(≤ ◦R)y. Since z |= A, we have y |= △A.
(HA) Assume that x |= HA, x ≤ y, but y 6|= HA. Then, there exists z such that
y(≤◦R)z and z 6|= A. Since x ≤ y, we have x(≤ ◦R)z. By z 6|= A, we get x 6|= HA,
a contradiction. 
Our next lemma showing a connection between validity in Int2GC+FS-frames
and Int2GC-frames is obvious and thus its proof is omitted.
Lemma 4.9. Let A ∈ Φ. Then, A is valid in the Int2GC+FS-frame (X,≤, R) if
and only A is valid in the Int2GC-frame (X,≤, R ◦ ≥,≤ ◦R).
Theorem 4.10 (Soundness II for Int2GC+FS). Every formula provable in
Int2GC+FS is Kripke-valid.
Proof. Suppose that △A → B is valid in a Int2GC+FS-frame (X,≤, R). Then,
by Lemma 4.9, △A → B is valid in the Int2GC-frame (X,≤, R ◦ ≥,≤ ◦ R). This
implies that A → HB is valid in the Int2GC-frame (X,≤, R ◦ ≥,≤ ◦ R), because
Int2GC-preserves validity of the Galois connection rules. By Lemma 4.9, A→ HB is
valid in the Int2GC+FS-frame (X,≤, R). Thus, (GC△H) preserves validity. Rules
(GCH△), (GCN▽), and (GC▽N) may be considered similarly.
We show that axiom (D1) is a valid formula. Validity of (D2) can be proved
analogously. By Corollary 3.9, this gives that the axioms of Int2GC+FS are valid.
Suppose x |= NA ∧ HB. Then, x |= NA and x |= HB. So, there exists y such
that x(R ◦ ≥)y and y |= A. Thus, there is w such that xRv and w ≥ y. Because
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of persistency, we have w |= A. Now x ≤ x and xRw imply x(≤ ◦ R)w. The fact
x |= HB means that for all z, x(≤◦R)z implies z |= B. Therefore, w |= B and thus
w |= A∧B. Because xRw and w ≥ w, we have x(R ◦≥)w implying x |= N(A∧B).
So, (D1) is a valid formula. 
Example 4.11. We present an application showing how preference relations may
be used for obtaining particular Kripke-frames of Int2GC+FS.Several definitions of
preference structures can be found in the literature; see [14]. There are two funda-
mental relations, namely “better” (strict preference) and “similar” (indifference).
Here we denote “b is better than a” by a ≺ b and a ∼ b denotes that a and b are
similar. Usually, it is assumed that ≺ and ∼ have at least the following properties:
(i) a ≺ b implies b ⊀ a (asymmetry of ≺)
(ii) a ∼ a (reflexivity of ∼)
(iii) a ∼ b implies b ∼ a (symmetry of ∼)
(iv) a ≺ b implies a ≁ b (incompatibility of ≺ and ∼)
Suppose now that ≺ is a transitive strict preference relation on some universe of
discourse U . Transitivity is a quite natural property of strict preference, because if
a is better than b and b is better than c, also a should be better that c.
Let us denote by  the relation ≺ ∪ ∆U , where ∆U is the identity relation of
U , that is, ∆U = {(x, x) | x ∈ U}. The relation  is obviously a preorder. Note
that since ≺ is assumed to be asymmetric, then a  b and b  a imply a = b. This
means that  is a partial order on U . Assume also that  and ∼ are connected by
conditions (R4) and (R5), that is,
(∼ ◦ ) ⊆ ( ◦ ∼) and ( ◦ ∼) ⊆ (∼ ◦ ),
where  is the inverse relation of . These assumptions hold for instance in such
object sets which can organized in “levels” as in Figure 1 – elements in the same
level are all similar with respect to their properties, and the elements in an upper
level are better than the lower ones.
Figure 1.
Hence, the triple (U,,∼) can be viewed as an Int2GC+FS-frame. Because the
relation ∼ is symmetric, HA and ▽A have equal interpretations, and the same holds
for NA and △A. This means that HA ↔ ▽A and NA ↔ △A are valid formulas in
any Kripke-model based on the frame (U,,∼). This implies, for instance, that
A → HNA and NHA → A are valid in all such Kripke-models for all Int2GC+FS-
formulas A.
Additionally, because ∼ and  are reflexive, we have that A→ NA and HA→ A
are valid in all Kripke-models based on (U,,∼). Let the formula A represent
some property, that is, x |= A means that the object x ∈ U has this property. The
formulas NA and HA have the following interpretations:
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(i) x |= NA if there exist y, z ∈ U such that x ∼ y, y  z and z |= A, that is,
x is similar to an object that is better than or equal to an object having the
property A.
(ii) x |= HA ⇐⇒ for all y, z, x  y and y ∼ z imply z |= A, that is, all objects
similar to the objects being better or equal to x have the property A.
Thus, the semantics based on preference and similarity∼ validates many formulas
that are not generally Int2GC+FS-provable. To get a full correspondence, one should
admit R to be any information relation satisfying (R4) and (R5), that is,
(R ◦ ) ⊆ ( ◦R) and ( ◦R) ⊆ (R ◦ ),
not just symmetric ones. Various information relations are studied in [4], for in-
stance.
4.2. Canonical Frames and Completeness of Int2GC+FS. To prove the com-
pleteness theorem with respect to Kripke-models, we will apply canonical frames
and the algebraic completeness for Int2GC+FS presented in Theorem 3.8(b).
The canonical Int2GC+FS-frame of an H2GC+FS-algebra (H,,,,) is a
structure (XH ,⊆, RH), where XH is the set of lattice-filters of H and the relation
RH is defined by
(x, y) ∈ RH ⇐⇒ [x]
−1
⊆ y ⊆ [x]
−1
.
The relation RH can be described also as
(x, y) ∈ RH ⇐⇒ [y]
−1
⊆ x ⊆ [y]
−1
.
This means that RH = RH1 ∩ R
H
2 , where R
H
1 and R
H
2 are the relations of the
canonical Int2GC-frame of an H2GC-algebra.
Next, we will show that the canonical Int2GC+FS-frame is a Kripke-frame of
Int2GC+FS. Before that, we present some results and observations that are needed
for our proofs. We denote by [S〉 the lattice-filter generated by S ⊆ H . It is well
known that [S〉 is the set of all elements a ∈ H such that a1 ∧ · · ·an ≤ a for some
elements a1, . . . , an ∈ S. We also denote for any x ∈ XH :
[x] = {a | a ∈ x}; [x] = {a | a ∈ x};
[x] = {a | a ∈ x}; [x] = {a | a ∈ x}.
Lemma 4.12. Let (H,,,,) be an H2GC+FS-algebra. If k is a filter and y is
a prime filter such that k ∩ [−y] = ∅, then there exists a prime filter u such that
k ⊆ u and u ∩ [−y] = ∅.
Proof. Let us denote Γ = {t | t is a filter, k ⊆ t, and t ∩ [−y] = ∅}. Clearly Γ 6= ∅
and, by Zorn’s Lemma, Γ has a maximal element u. Then, u is a filter, k ⊆ u, and
u ∩ [−y] = ∅.
Assume that u is not a prime filter. Then there exists two elements a, b ∈ H
such that a ∨ b ∈ u, but a, b /∈ u. By maximality of u, this implies that [u ∪ {a}〉
and [u ∪ {b}〉 are not in Γ. Therefore, we must have that [u ∪ {a}〉 ∩ [−y] 6= ∅
and [u∪ {b}〉 ∩ [−y] 6= ∅. So, there exists c, d ∈ [−y] such that c ∈ [u∪ {a}〉 and
d ∈ [u ∪ {b}〉. Because u is a filter, this implies that there exist e, f ∈ u such that
e ∧ a ≤ c and f ∧ b ≤ d. Now e ∧ f ∈ u and a ∨ b ∈ u imply (e ∧ f) ∧ (a ∨ b) ∈ u.
Since
(e ∧ f) ∧ (a ∨ b) = (e ∧ f ∧ a) ∨ (e ∧ f ∧ b) ≤ c ∨ d,
we obtain c ∨ d ∈ u. Now the exist c1, d1 ∈ −y such that c = c1 and d = d1
.
Because c ∨ d ∈ u and c ∨ d = c1 ∨ d1
 ≤ (c1 ∨ d1), we have (c1 ∨ d1) ∈ u. On
the other hand, c1, d1 /∈ y implies c1 ∨ d1 /∈ y, because y is a prime filter. Thus,
c1 ∨ d1 ∈ −y implies (c1 ∨ d1) ∈ [−y]. But u∩ [−y] = ∅, a contradiction. Thus,
u is a prime filter. 
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Let S be a non-empty subset of a lattice L such that a ∨ b ∈ S implies a ∈ S
or b ∈ S for all a, b ∈ L. It is easily seen that such sets S can be characterised as
the sets whose set-theoretical complement −S is a ∨-subsemilattice of L. In [7], we
proved the following lemma.
Lemma 4.13. Let L be a distributive lattice. If x is a filter and u is a superset of
x such that its set-theoretical complement −u is a ∨-subsemilattice of L, then there
exists a prime filter z such that x ⊆ z ⊆ u.
Our next proposition shows that the canonical frames are Int2GC+FS-frames.
Proposition 4.14. If (H,,,,) is an H2GC+FS-algebra, then (XH ,⊆, RH)
is an Int2GC+FS-frame.
Proof. (R4) Assume that x (RH ◦ ⊆) y. This implies that there exists z ∈ XH
such that xRH z and z ⊆ y. Then, [x]
−1
⊆ z ⊆ [x]
−1
. Let k = [x ∪ [y]) be
the filter generated by x ∪ [y]. We show first that k ∩ [−y] = ∅. Namely, if
k∩ [−y] 6= ∅, then there exists an element a such that a ∈ k and a ∈ [−y]. Since
a ∈ k = [x ∪ [y]), there are b ∈ x (recall that x is a filter) and c1, . . . , cn ∈ y such
that b ∧ c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cn ≤ a. Let us denote c = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cn ∈ y. Because the map
 is order-preserving, we have c ≤ c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cn. This means that b ∧ c ≤ a
and b ≤ c → a. Now a = d for some d ∈ −y, and so b ≤ c → d ≤ (c → d)
by (fs3). Since b ∈ x and x is a filter, we have (c → d) ∈ x. From this we get
c→ d ∈ [x]
−1
⊆ z ⊆ y. Because c ∈ y and y is a filter, also c ∧ (c→ d) ∈ y. Since
c ∧ (c→ d) ≤ d, we have d ∈ y, a contradiction. Hence, k ∩ [−y] = ∅.
By Lemma 4.12, there exists a prime filter u such that k ⊆ u and u∩ [−y] = ∅.
So, x ⊆ k ⊆ u, [y] ⊆ k ⊆ u, and y ⊆ [u]
−1
. In addition, [u]
−1
⊆ y, because
if a ∈ [u]
−1
, then a ∈ u which gives a /∈ [−y], because u ∩ [−y] = ∅. Thus,
a /∈ −y, that is, a ∈ y. Now x ⊆ u and uRH y give x (⊆ ◦RH) y.
(R5) Assume x (⊇◦RH) y. Then for some w ∈ XH , x ⊇ w and [w]

−1
⊆ y ⊆ [w]
−1
.
Hence, y ⊆ [x]
−1
, because 
−1
is order-preserving. To show that x (RH ◦ ⊇) y,
we need to find a prime filter z ∈ XH such that [x]
−1
⊆ z ⊆ [x]
−1
and z ⊇ y.
Consider the filter k =
[
y ∪ [x]
−1〉
. We show first that k ⊆ [x]
−1
. Assume a ∈ k.
Then, there exists c ∈ y and d ∈ [x]
−1
such that c∧d ≤ a (note that y is a filter and
[x]
−1
is closed under meets). Hence, c ≤ d → a and c ≤ (d → a) ≤ d → a
by (fs1). Since c ∈ y ⊆ [x]
−1
, we have c ∈ x and d → a ∈ x. Because d ∈ x,
we obtain a ∈ x, that is, a ∈ [x]
−1
as required.
Because k ⊆ [x]
−1
, k is a filter, and [x]
−1
is a set such that is set-theoretical
complement is a ∨-subsemilattice of L, by Lemma 4.13 there exists z ∈ XH such
that k ⊆ z ⊆ [x]
−1
. Combining the above observations, we have z ⊇ k ⊇ y and
[x]
−1
⊆ k ⊆ z ⊆ [x]
−1
, that is, xRH z and z ⊇ y. 
Let (H,,,,) be an H2GC+FS-algebra. Let v : Var → H be a valuation.
We may now define a valuation v∗ : Var → XH for the canonical frame FH =
(XH ,⊆, RH) by setting x ∈ v∗(p) if and only if v(p) ∈ x for all p ∈ Var. Hence, in
the canonical model (FH , v∗), we have x |= p if and only if v(p) ∈ x for all x ∈ XH .
We show that an analogous condition holds for all formulas A.
Lemma 4.15 (Key Lemma). Let (H,,,,) be an H2GC+FS-algebra and
v : Var → H a valuation. In the canonical model (FH , v∗), we have x |= A if and
only if v(A) ∈ x for all x ∈ XH and A ∈ Φ.
Proof. We prove the result by formula induction. For the connectives ∨, ∧, →, and
¬ the result is well known from the theory of intuitionistic logic. In addition, we
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only show the proofs for formulas △A and HA, since for NA and ▽A the proofs are
analogous.
(NA) Suppose that x |= NA. This means that there exists a prime filter y such
that x (RH ◦⊇) y and y |= A. By the induction hypothesis, we have that y ∈ v(A).
In addition, there exists a prime filter u such that xRH u and y ⊆ u, that is,
[x]
−1
⊆ u ⊆ [x]
−1
. We obtain directly that v(A) ∈ y ⊆ u ⊆ [x]
−1
, which means
that v(A) = v(NA) ∈ x.
Conversely, suppose v(NA) = v(A) ∈ x. Let us consider the filter k =
[
[x]
−1
∪
{v(A)}
〉
. First we show that k ⊆ [x]
−1
. Assume that a ∈ k. Then there exists
b ∈ [x]
−1
such that b ∧ v(A) ≤ a (note that [x]
−1
is closed under finite meets).
We have that v(A) ≤ b → a and v(A) ≤ (b → a) ≤ b → a by (fs1). This
implies b → a ∈ x. Because b ∈ x, we obtain a ∈ x and a ∈ [x]
−1
. Hence,
k ⊆ [x]
−1
. Because k is a filter and [x]
−1
is a set such that is set-theoretical
complement is a ∨-subsemilattice of H , we have by Lemma 4.13 that there exists
a prime filter y such that k ⊆ y ⊆ [x]
−1
. By the definition of k, [x]
−1
⊆ k ⊆ y
and v(A) ∈ k ⊆ y. We have [x]
−1
⊆ y ⊆ [x]
−1
, that is, xRH y. By the induction
hypothesis, y |= A. Since y ⊇ y holds trivially, we have x (RH ◦ ⊇) y implying
x |= NA.
(▽A) Suppose that v(▽A) = v(A) ∈ x. Let y ∈ XH . If y (RH ◦ ⊇)x, then there
exists z such that y RH z and z ⊇ x. Now y RH z is equivalent to [z]
−1
⊆ y ⊆
[z]
−1
. Therefore, v(A) ∈ x ⊆ z gives v(A) ∈ [z]
−1
⊆ y. By the induction
hypothesis, y |= A and hence x |= ▽A.
For the other direction, assume v(▽A) = v(A) /∈ x, that is, v(A) /∈ [x]
−1
. It
is easy to observe that [x]
−1
is a filter. Then, by the Prime Filter Theorem of
distributive lattices (see [7, Lemma 5.4], for instance), there exists a prime filter u
such that v(A) /∈ u and [x]
−1
⊆ u.
Let us consider the filter k = [x ∪ [u]〉. We first show that k ∩ [−u] = ∅. If
k ∩ [−u] 6= ∅, then there exists a ∈ k ∩ [−u]. Because a ∈ k = [x ∪ [u]〉, there
are b ∈ x and c1, . . . , cn ∈ u such that b ∧ c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cn ≤ a (recall that x is
a filter). Let us denote c = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cn ∈ u. Hence, c ≤ c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cn and
b ∧ c ≤ a. But now a = d for some d /∈ u. So, b ∧ c ≤ d. This gives that
b ≤ c → d ≤ (c → d) by (fs4). Because b ∈ x, we have (c → d) ∈ x. This
means that c→ d ∈ [x]
−1
⊆ u. Now c ∈ u implies d ∈ u, a contraction. Therefore,
k ∩ [−u] = ∅.
By Lemma 4.12, there exists a prime filter y such that k ⊆ y and y ∩ [−u] = ∅.
Since k ⊆ y, we have x ⊆ y and [u] ⊆ y meaning u ⊆ [y]
−1
. The fact that
y ∩ [−u] = ∅ implies [y]
−1
⊆ u, because if a ∈ [y]
−1
, then a ∈ y. This
gives a /∈ [−u], a /∈ −u, and a ∈ u. By combining our observations, we have
[y]
−1
⊆ u ⊆ [y]
−1
, that is, uRH y and y ⊇ x. Thus, u (RH ◦ ⊇)x. Because
v(A) /∈ u, we have u 6|= A by the induction hypothesis. Hence, x 6|= ▽A. 
As in case of Theorem 4.5, we may prove the following completeness result by
applying the Key Lemma.
Theorem 4.16 (Completeness II for Int2GC+FS). A formula A is provable
in Int2GC+FS if and only if A is Kripke-valid.
5. Connections to intuitionistic tense logic
Intuitionistic tense logic IKt was introduced by Ewald [9] by extending the lan-
guage of intuitionistic propositional logic with the usual temporal expressions FA
(A is true at some future time), PA (A was true at some past time), GA (A will
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be true at all future times), and HA (A has always been true in the past). The
Hilbert-style axiomatisation of IKt can be found in [9, p. 171]:
(1) All axioms of intuitionistic logic
(2) G(A→ B)→ (GA→ GB) (2′) H(A→ B)→ (HA→ HB)
(3) G(A ∧B)↔ GA ∧GB (3′) H(A ∧B)↔ HA ∧HB
(4) F (A ∨B)↔ FA ∨ FB (4′) P (A ∨B)↔ PA ∨ PB
(5) G(A→ B)→ (FA→ FB) (5′) H(A→ B)→ (PA→ PB)
(6) GA ∧ FB → F (A ∧B) (6′) HA ∧ PB → P (A ∧B)
(7) G¬A→ ¬FA (7′) H¬A→ ¬PA
(8) FHA→ A (8′) PGA→ A
(9) A→ HFA (9′) A→ GPA
(10) (FA→ GB)→ G(A→ B) (10′) (PA→ HB)→ H(A→ B)
(11) F (A→ B)→ (GA→ FB) (11′) P (A→ B)→ (HA→ PB)
The rules of inference are modus ponens (MP), and
(RH)
A
HA
(RG)
A
GA
Our next proposition shows that if we identify N, H, △, ▽ with F , G, P , H ,
respectively, then Int2GC+FS and IKt will become syntactically equivalent. Recall
that
Int2GC+FS = Int2GC+ {(FS1) or (FS4) or (D1)}+ {(FS2) or (FS3) or (D2)},
and Int2GC is obtained by extending intuitionistic logic with rules (GC▽N),
(GCN▽), (GCH△), and (GC△H).
Theorem 5.1. IKt = Int2GC+FS.
Proof. First we show that all axioms IKt are provable in Int2GC+FS, and all rules
of IKt are admissible in Int2GC+FS. In this first part, let ⊢ denote that a formula
A is provable in Int2GC+FS. As noted in Section 2, axioms (2), (2′), (3), (3′) (4),
(4′), (8), (8′), (9), (9′) are provable even in Int2GC. Additionally, rules (MP), (RH),
and (RG) are admissible in Int2GC. Axioms (10), (10′), (11), (11′) are the Fischer
Servi axioms (FS3), (FS4), (FS1), (FS2), so they are provable in Int2GC+FS.
Axiom (FS1) is equivalent to N(A→ B)∧HA→ NB. If we set B := A∧B in this
formula, we have that ⊢ (N(A→ A ∧B) ∧ HA)→ N(A ∧B). Because A→ A ∧ B
is equivalent to A → B, and ⊢ B → (A → B) gives ⊢ NB → N(A → B) by the
monotonicity of N, we obtain ⊢ NB ∧ HA→ N(A ∧ B) and thus (6) is provable in
Int2GC+FS. Provability of (6′) can be shown similarly.
Because ⊢ N▽(A → B) → (A → B), we have ⊢ N▽(A → B) ∧ A → B and
⊢ △(N▽(A → B) ∧ A) → △B. Let us set A := N▽(A → B) and B := A in axiom
(6′) (which we just showed to be provable in Int2GC+FS). We obtain ⊢ ▽N▽(A→
B) ∧ △A → △(N▽(A → B) ∧ A). Thus, ⊢ ▽N▽(A → B) ∧ △A → △B. Because
⊢ ▽(A → B) → ▽N▽(A → B), we have ⊢ ▽(A → B) ∧ △A → △B. This is
equivalent to ⊢ ▽(A → B) → (△A → △B). Hence, (5′) is provable in Int2GC+FS,
and provability of (5) can be showed in an analogous manner.
If we set B := ⊥ in (5), we get ⊢ H(A → ⊥) → (NA → N⊥). Because N⊥
is equivalent to ⊥, we have ⊢ H¬A → ¬NA. This means that (7) and (7′) are
provable.
Because axioms (10), (10′), (11), (11′) are the Fischer Servi axioms, for the other
direction is enough to show admissibility of rules (GC▽N), (GCN▽), (GCH△),
(GC△H) in IKt. First, we show admissibility of the rules of monotonicity, that is,
if A → B is provable, then HA → HB, PA → PB, GA → GB, and FA → FB
are provable.
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Here ⊢ A denotes that the formula A is provable in IKt. Assume ⊢ A→ B. By
(RG), ⊢ G(A → B). Now ⊢ GA → GB follows by (2), and from ⊢ G(A → B), we
obtain also ⊢ FA → FB by (5). Similarly, ⊢ A → B implies ⊢ HA → HB and
⊢ PA→ PB by applying (RH), (2′), and (5′).
Next we prove admissibility of (GC▽N). Assume that ⊢ A → HB. Then,
FA → FHB by monotonicity of F . Because ⊢ FHB → B by (8), we obtain
⊢ FA → B. Similarly, by (8′) and monotonicity of P , A → GB implies PA → B,
that is, (GCH△) is admissible in IKt. Monotonicity of H and axiom (9) yield
FA → B implies A → HB, and monotonicity of G and (9′) give that PA → B
implies A→ BG. Thus, rules (GCN▽) and (GC△H) are admissible. 
Remark 5.2. It is proved in [15] that ILGC is equivalent, with respect to provability,
to the minimal (classical) tense logic Kt, that is, ILGC can be viewed as a simple
formulation of Kt. The same analogy applies here, because Int2GC+FS can be seen
as an alternative formulation of IKt.
It should be noted that with respect to Kripke-semantics, IKt and Int2GC+FS
are quite different. A Kripke-frame of IKt consists of a partially-ordered set (Γ,≤)
(the “states-of-knowledge”), family of sets Tγ , where γ ∈ Γ (times known at state-
of-knowledge γ), such that γ ≤ ϕ implies Tγ ⊆ Tϕ, meaning that advancing in
knowledge retains what is known about times and their temporal ordering, and
a collection of binary relations µγ on Tγ (the temporal ordering of Tγ as it is
understood at state-of-knowledge γ) [9], whereas Int2GC+FS is conceived as an
information logic such that its frames (X,≤, R) are such that X forms the universe
of discourse, and ≤ and R are relations reflecting relationships between the objects
in X , such as preference and indifference of objects (see Example 4.11).
It is also obvious and well-known that the axiomatisation of Ewald is not min-
imal, because several axioms can be deduced from the other axioms. We present
a reduced axiomatisation, in which the number of axioms is the half of the size of
the axiomatisation in [9].
Proposition 5.3. IKt can be axiomatised by adding (2), (2
′), (5), (5′), (8), (8′),
(9), (9′), (11), (11′) to the axioms of intuitionistic logic together with rules (MP),
(RH), and (RG).
Proof. As shown in the proof of Theorem 5.1, if N, H, △, ▽ are identified with F ,
G, P , H , then axioms (2), (2′), (5), (5′), (8), (8′), (9), (9′) with rules (MP), (RH)
and (RG) are enough to show that rules (GC▽N), (GCN▽), (GCH△), (GC△H)
are admissible. Axioms (11), (11′) coincide with (FS1) and (FS2), so the proof is
complete, because IKt = Int2GC+FS. 
In the next proposition, we present another axiomatisation of Int2GC using ax-
ioms of intuitionistic tense logic.
Proposition 5.4. Int2GC can be axiomatised by adding (2), (2′), (8), (8′), (9),
(9′) to the axioms of intuitionistic logic together with rules (MP), (RH), (RG), and
rules:
(RMF)
A→ B
FA→ FB
(RMP)
A→ B
PA→ PB
Proof. Monotonicity of G and H follow from (RG), (RH), (2), and (2′). Because all
operators are thus monotone, admissibility of rules (GC▽N), (GCN▽), (GCH△),
(GC△H) follow easily from (8), (8′), (9), (9′).
On the other hand, in Section 2 we have noted that axioms (2), (2′), (8), (8′), (9),
(9′) are provable in Int2GC and rules (RH), (RG), (RMF), (RMP) are admissible.

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Let us observe that Int2GC cannot be axiomatised by using only axioms and
rules of Ewald’s system. The reason for this is that monotonicity of operators P
and F need to be added, since rules (RMF) and (RMP) do not belong to the system
by Ewald as “initial rules”, even they are admissible in IKt. On the other hand,
monotonicity of P and F could be obtained by adding axioms (5) and (5′) to the
system of Proposition 5.4 (without monotonicity of F and P ), but then we have a
logic which is too strong, since (5) and (5′) cannot be proved in Int2GC – this is
because Galois connections (N,▽) and (△,H) are “independent”, that is, operations
N and H are not in anyway connected with each other. For instance, consider an
H2GC-algebra on the three element chain 0 < u < 1 such that  and  equal the
identity mapping, and x = 0 and x = 1 for all x ∈ {0, u, 1}. Then (1→ u) = 1,
but 1 → u = 1 → u = u. This actually means that we have an “intermediate
logic” Int2GC + {(5), (5′)} situated between Int2GC and Int2GC+FS. However, the
study of Int2GC+ {(5), (5′)} is confined outside of the scope of this work.
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